Presentation by Goran Grubacevic
Michel Henry (1922–2002) developed a radically revised approach to phenomenology through a critical reading of the phenomenological tradition (especially of Husserl and Heidegger). Henry named his approach “phenomenology of life” and, before that, “material phenomenology” or “radical phenomenology”. Perhaps the most characteristic, as well as most controversial, feature of Henry’s phenomenology of life is that it grounds intentionality in a pre-intentional form of appearing, namely immanent affectivity or “life”. In the last period of his work (1992–2002), Henry developed a philosophy of religion and Christianity based on his phenomenology. He is widely recognised as one of the major figures of 20th-century French phenomenology.
Join us this Thursday as Goran Grubacevic helps us examine whether Henry’s phenomenology of life is the total antithesis to AI, the second evening of our series on phenomenology.
